The appearance of numerous Chinese fishing vessels in the South China Sea shortly after China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels employed water cannons against a Philippine ship suggests that China’s contentious maritime militia might become active should a conflict arise involving Beijing, Manila, and the US-led coalition, reported The Eurasian Times.
Recently, the US, Australia, and Japan announced joint exercises in the South China Sea in response to the August 5 incident, during which six CCG ships, along with the fishing militia that often operates as China’s quasi-military and unofficial maritime border management arm, obstructed two Philippine Navy-chartered civilian vessels delivering supplies to Philippine forces stationed at the Second Thomas Shoal.
Images posted on X (formerly Twitter) on August 16 depicted a substantial gathering of fishing vessels, potentially numbering in the hundreds, in the South China Sea, navigating around a cluster of small islands. Scholars and observers of China have long studied this maritime militia, which has been deployed in prior disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines over contested territories.
Concurrently, the joint drills conducted by Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra will involve helicopter carriers and three naval aircraft, showcasing military strength through coordinated exercises. The US plans to deploy the USS America aircraft carrier, while Japan will send its JS Izumo, one of the largest warships in its fleet. The Royal Australian Navy’s HMAS Canberra, equipped with helicopters, will also participate, with the joint exercise having been planned several months earlier.
Described as a sea border management and enforcement entity, the ‘maritime militia’ serves to assert China’s maritime rights and claims. It also has a secondary role in warfare, involving surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistical duties. While reports from sources like the RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggest that these boats may lack missile or weapon armament, some experts speculate that China could choose to arm them in specific circumstances.
China’s concept of the maritime militia has evolved since its 2000 defense white paper, transitioning from a naval-focused approach to a more multifaceted, collaborative strategy. The maritime militia, often supported by maritime law enforcement agencies, has become a frontline response to contingencies, allowing the PLA Navy (PLAN) to assume background roles.
While these fishing vessels seem to hold more logistical value than direct combat capability, they are regarded by China as “an armed mass organization composed of civilians retaining their regular jobs.” The maritime militia serves as an auxiliary and reserve force for the PLA, supporting the military by performing security, logistics, and frontline functions during wartime.
This engagement includes supplying ammunition or provisions to warships at sea and supporting other vessels in the PLAN fleet assigned to specific tasks. Although it’s unclear whether the PLAN and the militia have practiced together, the militia receives training from both the PLAN and CCG.
In these “gray zone” operations, the maritime militia demonstrates significant naval warfare potential while benefiting from a degree of ambiguity. The vast number of low-cost fishing vessels employing swarm tactics could present an asymmetric threat to warships, akin to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy’s actions in the Persian Gulf against the US Navy.
Furthermore, these fishing vessels possess an advantage over smaller naval crafts due to the plausible deniability linked to their origin and function. Warship commanders might hesitate to attack civilian targets with unclear military affiliations on the open seas.
